Why do govts continue to abide by one convention – general elections at least every five years – when they could presumably vote in the Commons to postpone elections on the same basis that they voted to skip past the fixed term act? As in, what is the force that compels them to stick to that unwritten constitutional aspect other than "decency"?
5 year election intervals are not a "convention", they are embodied in law. Because deferring elections beyond five year intervals would require an amendment to the relevant Act (I think the Representation of the People Act). That would require the consent of the House of Lords. And this is one of the very few provisions where the HoL cannot be overruled by the Hoc under the terms of the Parliament Acts.
The FTPA wasn't circumvented - there was overwhelming support for an election in the HoC. Parliament made the decision, not the PM.
Section 2 FTPA provided for "early elections" if either there was a successful vote of no confidence in the Government, or if 2/3rds of MPs voted for an early election. And that is what happened.
Ok and again thank you but the original post is asking how to provide an alternative to PM fiat that cannot be easily undone by a following act of parliament so I’m asking why you cannot out a new act on the same harder-to-undo footing as the Representation of the People act you referred to
Parliament could of course do exactly that if there was a majority in both Houses in favour (and adequate time was given in the Parliamentary timetable for the legislation to be considered).
Most countries (or at least the ones I know about) have elections every four years. They also have proportional representation, another element which limits the ability of a single party to call all the shots, particularly when they are elected on a minority vote, as well as being very unpopular. Both measures would, I think, benefit our ailing democracy.
The Jenkins Commission recommended mixed-member proportional, as used for the Scottish Parliament and in New Zealand, for Westminster. It'd be nice to see that recommendation acted on.
Could we ever engineer an Act that would make the Supreme Court the arbiter of whether legislation is unconstitutional? Or would a future parliament simply repeal it?
We could, but the only way I can think of it sticking is if we then break up what is now the British parliament to a number of substation bodies eg regional parliaments+ a federal parliament who could only over turn the British parliament acts by all agreeing, which would be unlikely
Not what you're asking, but I'm day dreaming about an electorate-scale equivalent to letters of no-confidence sent to the chair of the 1922 committee - a mark from each voter that they would like an election now please, and when they reach some threshold, an election is called. They would be automatically cleared after an election.
Even if the party I vote for didn't win it would generally be in my interest to let them have a go for a bit, to avoid government being absolutely seized up and endless elections (which can happen anyway in some countries). And it encourages the party in government to seek consensus, because anything sufficiently bad will result in more bad marks.
I can see two things you can do to make this very workable:
1. The clearing of marks happens immediately after the first State Opening of Parliament of the new Parliament; this means that marks delivered before the legislative programme has been set out are ignored.
2. The threshold is set high enough that the only way for it to trigger quickly is if even supporters of the winning party (or parties in a coalition) are demanding an election now - at least half the number of voters who voted in the last election, perhaps (thus enabling rapid elections in sequence if turnout falls to a very low figure, but protecting the winners in a high-turnout election).
It has been said before that a prime minister in command of a majority in parliament can do pretty much what they like, within the term of that parliament. Acts can be passed, then abolished. Improvements can be undone by the next incumbent. A first past the post electoral system coupled with a lack of constraint on what a PM with a majority can do doesn’t seem to be a recipe for stability or progress. Begs the question of what a better constitutional settlement would look like (there must be many) but also, how would we ever get there?
The easiest fix for this is Proportional Representation. The downside is that parties will splinter and coalitions will be formed after the vote not before it. However, both major parties have each become less of a wide church so perhaps the splintering has already happened, and the voting system just needs to catch up?
The solution is an Act of Parliament (a "constitution") which dissolves Parliament without calling a new one, and instead calls elections for a National Assembly which is subject to constitutionally defined powers and fixed election dates. A bit like extreme devolution. This would not of itself prevent the head of government from using the Crown's revived prerogative powers to call fresh Parliamentary elections and for that new Parliament to revise the constitution (or just go back to legislating), but it could be done. It won't happen, of course.
But the point of the FTPA was that it effectively placed the date of the election in the hands of Parliament and not the Prime Minister. Where the government has an overwhelming parliamentary majority (and its MPs follow the whip) there perhaps isn't much difference between the position under the FTPA and the PM exercising prerogative powers. However, where there is a minority government, the FTPA had a real impact in transferring power to Parliament from the executive. So I would argue that it was effective during the period of minority Conservative governments, as it placed the timing of elections in the hands of Parliament, and not the PM.
Worth remembering that having a convention via the Royal Prerogative, rather than an immutable written constitution, meant that the National / Coalition Government during WWII could just about carry on for ten years after the previous General Election in 1935, until the peace was won - well, in Europe anyway. I accept though that does also depend upon having reasonably honourable people in charge.
Why do govts continue to abide by one convention – general elections at least every five years – when they could presumably vote in the Commons to postpone elections on the same basis that they voted to skip past the fixed term act? As in, what is the force that compels them to stick to that unwritten constitutional aspect other than "decency"?
5 year election intervals are not a "convention", they are embodied in law. Because deferring elections beyond five year intervals would require an amendment to the relevant Act (I think the Representation of the People Act). That would require the consent of the House of Lords. And this is one of the very few provisions where the HoL cannot be overruled by the Hoc under the terms of the Parliament Acts.
Ah ok thanks but still why wasn’t there the same issue with the fixed term act, why was it so easily circumvented
The FTPA wasn't circumvented - there was overwhelming support for an election in the HoC. Parliament made the decision, not the PM.
Section 2 FTPA provided for "early elections" if either there was a successful vote of no confidence in the Government, or if 2/3rds of MPs voted for an early election. And that is what happened.
Ok and again thank you but the original post is asking how to provide an alternative to PM fiat that cannot be easily undone by a following act of parliament so I’m asking why you cannot out a new act on the same harder-to-undo footing as the Representation of the People act you referred to
Parliament could of course do exactly that if there was a majority in both Houses in favour (and adequate time was given in the Parliamentary timetable for the legislation to be considered).
Most countries (or at least the ones I know about) have elections every four years. They also have proportional representation, another element which limits the ability of a single party to call all the shots, particularly when they are elected on a minority vote, as well as being very unpopular. Both measures would, I think, benefit our ailing democracy.
The Jenkins Commission recommended mixed-member proportional, as used for the Scottish Parliament and in New Zealand, for Westminster. It'd be nice to see that recommendation acted on.
Could we ever engineer an Act that would make the Supreme Court the arbiter of whether legislation is unconstitutional? Or would a future parliament simply repeal it?
We could, but the only way I can think of it sticking is if we then break up what is now the British parliament to a number of substation bodies eg regional parliaments+ a federal parliament who could only over turn the British parliament acts by all agreeing, which would be unlikely
Not what you're asking, but I'm day dreaming about an electorate-scale equivalent to letters of no-confidence sent to the chair of the 1922 committee - a mark from each voter that they would like an election now please, and when they reach some threshold, an election is called. They would be automatically cleared after an election.
Even if the party I vote for didn't win it would generally be in my interest to let them have a go for a bit, to avoid government being absolutely seized up and endless elections (which can happen anyway in some countries). And it encourages the party in government to seek consensus, because anything sufficiently bad will result in more bad marks.
I can see two things you can do to make this very workable:
1. The clearing of marks happens immediately after the first State Opening of Parliament of the new Parliament; this means that marks delivered before the legislative programme has been set out are ignored.
2. The threshold is set high enough that the only way for it to trigger quickly is if even supporters of the winning party (or parties in a coalition) are demanding an election now - at least half the number of voters who voted in the last election, perhaps (thus enabling rapid elections in sequence if turnout falls to a very low figure, but protecting the winners in a high-turnout election).
It has been said before that a prime minister in command of a majority in parliament can do pretty much what they like, within the term of that parliament. Acts can be passed, then abolished. Improvements can be undone by the next incumbent. A first past the post electoral system coupled with a lack of constraint on what a PM with a majority can do doesn’t seem to be a recipe for stability or progress. Begs the question of what a better constitutional settlement would look like (there must be many) but also, how would we ever get there?
And yet the UK has seen centuries of world-historically exceptional stability and progress under this very system.
The easiest fix for this is Proportional Representation. The downside is that parties will splinter and coalitions will be formed after the vote not before it. However, both major parties have each become less of a wide church so perhaps the splintering has already happened, and the voting system just needs to catch up?
The solution is an Act of Parliament (a "constitution") which dissolves Parliament without calling a new one, and instead calls elections for a National Assembly which is subject to constitutionally defined powers and fixed election dates. A bit like extreme devolution. This would not of itself prevent the head of government from using the Crown's revived prerogative powers to call fresh Parliamentary elections and for that new Parliament to revise the constitution (or just go back to legislating), but it could be done. It won't happen, of course.
But the point of the FTPA was that it effectively placed the date of the election in the hands of Parliament and not the Prime Minister. Where the government has an overwhelming parliamentary majority (and its MPs follow the whip) there perhaps isn't much difference between the position under the FTPA and the PM exercising prerogative powers. However, where there is a minority government, the FTPA had a real impact in transferring power to Parliament from the executive. So I would argue that it was effective during the period of minority Conservative governments, as it placed the timing of elections in the hands of Parliament, and not the PM.
Worth remembering that having a convention via the Royal Prerogative, rather than an immutable written constitution, meant that the National / Coalition Government during WWII could just about carry on for ten years after the previous General Election in 1935, until the peace was won - well, in Europe anyway. I accept though that does also depend upon having reasonably honourable people in charge.