Thinking about a revolution

Some things are changing rather fundamentally and the way we think should perhaps change too

There is that scene in Monty Python’s Quest for the Holy Grail where an armed knight crashes and easily wastes a wedding party.

And of course, this armed knight is able to cause so much damage at a wedding party - nobody would expect this to happen and so nobody would think to to stop him.

He shows that it is really not very difficult to move fast and break things.

The surviving gate guard outside just looks on bemused at this, and he says, “hey”.

This is pretty much what many are also doing as they watch what is happening in the United States.

They see what is happening, and their response is also a bemused “hey”.

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Students on university history courses often study historiography - the study of historians and how they write about history.

Sometimes this study of historiography includes a look at how different historians have used certain words and concepts, such as ‘revolution’.

And those students then find that such words and concepts have been used at different times and in different ways.

So, for example, students looking at ‘revolution’ may come across the so-called ‘diplomatic revolution’ of 1756.

In early 2025 we seem to be having a similar ‘diplomatic revolution’ - in real time, and this feels odd as in the United Kingdom we have not really had one for a long while.

When I mentioned this on social media, this was one insightful response:

The United States’ current deliberate alienation (and worse) of its long-term allies is a similarly fundamental - and, no doubt, similarly consequential - shift.

And although one should hesitate before saying anything as pointed as describing president Trump and Vice-President as Russian assets, their conduct is indistinguishable from them being so.

Everything they are doing appears to increase Russian power and to limit United States power.

There seems to be no other explanatory model that explains as much.

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This is not to say that they are necessarily actively corrupt: one is reminded of an old joke-poem about Fleet Street journalism:

You cannot hope
to bribe or twist,
thank God! the
British journalist.

But, seeing what
the man will do
unbribed, there's
no occasion to.

In addition to any actual corruption, there seems to be also an ideological commitment to promote and protect Russia at the expense of everyone else.

Perhaps the ghost of Stalin is now kicking itself - had he only described his regime as Russian nationalist as opposed to communist, he may not have been bothered by American cold war policy and 1950s McCarthyism and so on.

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One thing about a (genuine) revolution, like a (genuine) crisis, is that they are unpredictable in their course and in their outcome.

And another thing about a (genuine) revolution is that it often requires there to be new concepts and new words, so as to describe things which are new.

Imagine living through the French Revolution without the benefit of hindsight: from the storming of the Bastille and the ending of the monarchy to the Terror, and from the Terror to the rise of Bonapartism, and from Bonapartism to a massive war and imperial conquest, and from a massive war and imperial conquest to a total defeat and the restoration of the monarchy.

And at each stage, nobody knowing what will happen and everything always confused and foggy and (frankly) terrifying.

Events unfold into things which were not only unexpected but also unprecedented.

Decades later, of course, the frenzy settles down to calm historical narratives.

But at the time, things did not seem like that.

As somebody once said of “realistic” war films, the only realistic war film would have bullets spraying out randomly from the cinema screen.

The same can be said about reading about social and political upheavals.

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Revolutions are thereby not often fun - despite (or because of) the enthusiasm of self-appointed revolutionaries.

Wise conservatives once knew this. There is a good case that modern conservatism (at least in Europe) came out from the reaction to the French Revolution - with its philosophy articulated by Edmund Burke and its statecraft practiced by Metternich.

Constitutional arrangements and the international order were regarded as fragile things - to be, well, conserved.

(Hence, conservatism.)

Yes, one could (to be anarchistic) move fast and break things. But that was neither clever nor wise. One can imagine the looks at the faces of Burke and Metternich and others at the antics of Elon Musk and DOGE

And the reason and the motive to oppose liberals, progressives and radicals was for Burke and Metternich that in their demands for reform and progress the liberals, progressives and radicals risked the fragility of constitutional arrangements and the international order.

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One of the most remarkable features of current “conservatism” is that that it turns this conservatism of Burke and Metternich on its head.

It is almost as if the word and concept of conservatism has had its own revolution, and it has now become the very thing it once opposed.

The only common quality is that both old-style and new conservatism grasp the fragility of constitutional arrangements and the international order.

But instead of the caution of old-style conservatives, the new conservatives see that very fragility as an opportunity to trash and do damage.

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And so all sorts of things are now being unleashed.

Here are a couple of literary examples of horrors being unleashed in their giddy destructive excitement.

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In the words of Yeats:

“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

The ceremony of innocence is drowned;

The best lack all conviction, while the worst

Are full of passionate intensity.”

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Or in the words of C. S. Lewis:

“But such people! […] bull-headed men; spirits of evil trees and poisonous plants; and other creatures whom I won't describe because if I did the grown-ups would probably not let you read this book—Cruels and Hags and Incubuses, Wraiths, Horrors, Efreets, Sprites, Orknies, Wooses, and Ettins. In fact here were all those who were on the Witch's side […]”

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Alas, unlike the original literary texts from which those quotes are extracted, we are perhaps unlikely to be saved by a second coming, or even a first one.

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What has been done in the last few weeks by Trump and his cronies cannot - at least on a conceptual level - be undone.

They have shown just how fragile are their constitutional arrangements and the international order.

That cannot be un-invented.

Other countries would now be prudent to regulate their affairs so as to minimise or eliminate their dependency on the United States - it is no longer a question of waiting out until the next United States elections.

And other political systems would be wise to limit what can be done within their own constitutions by executive order, and to strengthen the roles of the legislature and the judiciary (and also of internal independent legal advice within government).

What is happening in the United States can happen elsewhere.

It can happen here.

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Any political culture has a stockpile of political anecdotes, precedents and other antecedents, examples and illustrations, fables and proverbs.

“Peel did this” and “Roosevelt did that” and “This is just like the 1930s”.

There is nothing wrong with this - indeed it is an inevitable part of any political culture, essentially it is a shared set of memes and gifs that help us make sense of what is going on around us.

The problem is that old categories and concepts often do not match the novelty of what is now unfolding.

We many need to think about things in a new way - so as to work out to defeat what is unwelcome.

We may need to have a revolution in our own minds.

And not just go “hey” instead.

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(And to my history tutors from the early 1990s, I am really sorry this historiography essay is thirty-five years too late.)