Political accountability vs policy accountability
How our system of politics and government is geared to avoid or evade accountability for policy
Over at Bluesky, the German writer and historian Helene von Bismarck, an acute observer of British politics, posted this interesting question:
“One question I have been asking myself for many years about UK politics: Why does it - regardless of who is in government - appear to be this hard to solve problems & get things done? Schools, the NHS, defence procurement, etc. Lack of money, you (probably) say. But surely this isn’t all of it?”
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One answer, of course, is that there is a lack of accountability.
On the face of it, however, there is a great deal. of accountability in the politics of the United Kingdom.
There are general elections, where the government of the day can fail to obtain a majority - as in 1997, 2010, 2017 and 2024 - as well as by-elections and regional and local elections which often (are said to) give governments a ‘bloody nose’ (or something).
And between general elections, Prime Ministers can come and go - as in 1990, 2007, 2016, 2019, and 2022 (twice).
And then, at the levels below Prime Minister, ministers come and go, often with undue frequency.
We also have the theatres of Prime Ministers Questions and the various political shows on television and the radio (and increasingly with podcasts), and we have a well-connected and ambitious lobby of Westminster journalists.
And so, superficially at least, we have a near-constant buzz of accountability - almost all day, every day.
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But.
If the word “accountability” is taken to mean (as it should be) that the accountable person can be required to give an account of what they are doing, then things look rather different.
For in the United Kingdom we have a great deal of political accountability, we have far less policy accountability.
And by policy, it is meant the formulation, implementation and administration of things by government.
The theatres of political debate and discussion do not often go to the substance of policy - and often policy only seems relevant to the extent that it offers a ready “gotcha” against a hapless or hopeless minister.
The lobby system of journalism - and there are some outstanding lobby journalists - necessarily requires a focus on the politics of Westminster, rather than on what is happening in Whitehall - and still less on what is happening outside SW1.
The doctrine of individual ministerial accountability provides a mutually beneficial pact where a minister can (plausibly) say that they were not aware of something while officials escape routine accountability for what they do.
Parliamentary questions are easily evaded either in written or oral form, with no sanction for tardiness or non-compliance.
And as for Freedom of Information, the departmental section 17 letters refusing disclosure are perhaps the most dismal and insincere - if not outright dishonest - official documents in the history of our domestic bureaucracy.
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One illustration of how weak policy accountability is in the United Kingdom are the now (all too frequent) public inquiries.
These inquiries - sometimes long after the events being investigated - often do little more than what could have been done at the time, if the organs of the state had had the necessary powers and the requisite will.
To take one glaring example: the Covid inquiry is forcing politicians and officials to give an account - ie provide accountability - about everyday decision- and policy-making during the pandemic.
This should have been done in and by parliament at the time.
Many revelations that come out of that and other inquiries is an indication of the weakness of our traditional forms of accountability.
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Why is all this so?
Part of the reason is legal(istic) - inquiries have formal legal powers which are not generally available to (say) parliamentary committees and still less available to journalists.
But the main reason is there is no real incentive for government and parliament and officials and the media to have it any other way: no careers will be benefited, there is no electoral advantage, there are no extra viewers or listeners, and there no more newspapers sold (or fewer copies left unsold).
And the primary reason for this lack of incentive is, well, us.
If voters (and viewers and readers) wanted more real-time policy accountability then there would be career, commercial and/or electoral advantages in there being more policy accountability.
But that would mean us taking policy seriously, which is dull and complicated.
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There are, however, grounds for some optimism.
Parliamentary select committees - especially in their online manifestations - are becoming increasingly impressive in what evidence is made publicly available in their ongoing inquiries.
The House of Commons library also make their outstanding briefings available to the public as well as to parliamentarians.
The decline in specialist journalists is - though only to a limited extent - being offset by specialist commentators - on Substack or elsewhere.
But, even taking all these positive points at their highest, there is generally little or no incentive for there to be real accountability, as opposed to superficial (and theatrical) accountability.
And so the massive policy problems identified by von Bismarck in her post do not have ready solutions - though, no doubt, there will one day be a scathing public inquiry about each of them.