A guided tour of President Trump's 33-page, $5 billion lawsuit against the British Broadcasting Corporation

How some parts are strong, some parts are weak - and why a strict legalistic analysis will not tell the whole story.

After a delay after his legal threats, President Donald Trump has finally filed a law suit against the British Broadcasting Corporation.

The case has been brought in Florida and you can read the 33-page filing here.

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Below I conduct a “guided tour” of the document, showing where it is weak (and very weak) and also where it is strong(er).

I also set out how such a lawsuit fits in with President Trump’s wider use of such cases as a form of leverage, alongside “non-legal” tactics.

With President Trump a lawsuit is never the whole story.

As this sort of post takes a lot of effort, often with opportunity cost, it is was under a paid subscription wall - at least for now. (I hope it is worth a paid subscription!). I may take it from under the subscription wall later.

Let us start with some provisos - two of which are general if not universal, and the other is particular.

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The first is that, like many of you, I am not an America lawyer, though I have a lot of experience of reading such legal documents, including as a commentator.

But there may be technical points of which I am unaware - and this is why anyone needing advice on an unfamiliar legal issue should always instruct a lawyer.

That said, as long as we are always aware that there may be things we do not know we can have a go at reading and assessing this public domain document.

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The second is that litigation is (or should be) impossible to predict with absolute certainty. This is because the ultimate determination of any contested case is (or should be) determined by third parties separate from the parties - and separate from you following the case.

But as a famous English barrister once said to a befuddled judge: you may be none the wiser, but you can be better informed.

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The third is that, as already mentioned, any legal case brought by Donald Trump is not really about the law. It is about leverage - deal-making by another name. A law suit is one tool - indeed weapon - among other forms of pressure and indeed extortion.

In this Trump was schooled by the infamous Roy Cohn who, despite dying in 1986, has become one of the most significant lawyers of the twenty-first century.

A legal analysis of any case brought by Trump is not in-and-of-itself telling about what will happen - or why it has been brought or how it will be settled or otherwise ended.

But.

A legal analysis is not altogether irrelevant. A weak case places Trump in a weak overall position, and vice versa for stronger cases. A robust and confident response can get him to back down.

So as long as we do not get carried away with the legal(istic) merits of case we can use an understanding of a case to give us a better understanding of this particular use of “lawfare”.

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Now let us look at his document.

Click here and open a new tab, if you have not already.

Have a scroll - get a sense of the document as a whole.

Almost all legal documents are not linear but complex - they are not written as a story to read like a narrative, but are internally interconnected: more akin to computer code than a typical short story.

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What does this document tell us? And what does it not tell us?

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Looking at the document overall it has weak parts: including one very long (which should be shorter) and one short (which should be longer).

In essence Trump and his lawyers have three problems: that there is (still) no evidence of anyone in the United States actually watching the programme before the presidential election, that the BBC need to be shown to malicious or similar, and that there is no evidence of any damage suffered.

The document as a whole does its best to mask and compensate these three deficiencies.

But as a reader, an awareness of these deficiencies will help us understand what is in (and not in) the document - like knowing the Marley brothers are dead to begin with.

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Now let us turn to the introduction.

Here is a paragraph - emphasis added:

In litigation documents the use of such bombastic language is often a tell.

A strong legal case does not need such rhetoric - the law and the facts will speak for themselves.

And a weak legal case is not saved by such language - no case will turn on such rabid terms.

The usual reasons for deploying such fiery vocabulary are to intimidate and to evade. A weak respondent may feel cowered by such language, and (in high profile cases) it will divert the attention of the media unused to reading cases. It may also be an attempt to impress an eventual jury in a jury case.

But it really is flapdoodle.

Let us move to the substance.

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The key problem Trump and his lawyers have is to establish jurisdiction and venue.

For if they cannot persuade a Florida court that it is the correct venue and has jurisdiction then the case comes to an abrupt end.

This is because - legally and logically - jurisdiction and venue is a priority matter. If a court cannot properly hear a case, then it is kicked out.

Here the 33-page filing looks desperate.

From page 5 to 22 we have paragraph after paragraph seeking to establish that Florida is the correct jurisdiction and venue.

What we know - and what Trump’s lawyers know - is that they have no evidence that anyone in Florida actually watched the programme before the presidential election.

And knowing this the 26 paragraphs on jurisdiction and venue look wanting.

Just as the greatest Twilight Zone story (incidentally a Christmas one) is Five Characters in Search of an Exit, what we have here are 17 pages and 26 paragraphs in search of a single viewer.

Without a viewer Trump and his lawyers have to get the court to infer that the programme somehow must have been watched in the jurisdiction.

And here they use everything they can think of - including that the BBC provides a Florida weather forecast:

They summarise their position like this (emphasis added):

The Panorama Documentary’s publicity, coupled with significant increases in VPN usage in Florida since its debut, establishes the immense likelihood that citizens of Florida accessed the Documentary before the BBC had it removed.

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It the best Trump’s lawyers can do is “immense likelihood” then they are not where they really would like to be.

(And this also will have a knock-on effect for damages, as they are somehow arguing that there was immense damage even though they cannot show anyone who saw it.)

What Trump’s lawyers are presumably hoping for is that their 17 pages and 26 paragraphs are enough to satisfy a court that the jurisdiction and venue issue should be dealt with at a full hearing, rather than being the basis of what an English lawyer would call a strike-out.

This is because if Trump and his lawyers survive a preliminary attack on jurisdiction (even if the issue is held over until later) then they are in a stronger position to exert pressure on the British Broadcasting Corporation to settle.

For the next part of the case is where Trump is stronger.

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The BBC made a mistake.

That cannot be denied and - as I have said previously - it was wise for the BBC not to deny it.

The reason it prudent to admit the mistake was that if they contested that a mistake had been made, they would lose. And if this does end up before a trial, having a jury or judge disbelieve your defence is dangerous for your other points which otherwise would be in your favour.

The 33-page document sets out that a mistake was made. This is where it is on firmer ground.

But.

It is not enough for Trump and his lawyers to show a mistake was made - they also have to show (because of United States defamation law) that malice or similar untoward motives were present.

And to do this his lawyers seek to set out that there is a pattern of wrongful conduct by the BBC.

Here we come to this passage for the ages (at least for anyone from the United Kingdom):

No less an authority than the United Kingdom’s former Prime Minister, Liz Truss, discussed this bias, the need to hold the BBC accountable, and the BBC’s pattern of actual malice.

Priceless.

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But more seriously - the tactic here is to avoid the case being knocked out on the basis that they have not shown malice or similar bad faith.

Although they assert malice again and again, they have also made a go at showing circumstantial evidence of malice or bad faith.

Again, this is not (or should not) be enough to win the case - but that is not the practical strategy.

The strategy is to keep the case from being knocked out until they have forced some sort of settlement.

Trump’s lawyers know they are weak on malice just as they are weak on jurisdiction, but they need the case going so that they can force some sort of settlement.

That is: to keep the case going longer than an Elizabeth Truss premiership.

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And we then move onto damages - paragraphs 97 to 102, 108, 112 to 113, and 118.

This is weak stuff - and short.

Damages are asserted, but not shown.

There are no particulars, no specifics.

But it does not really matter at this stage of the document, as a court will usually only inquire into damages once the rest of the case has been dealt with.

Trump’s lawyers will also know this is weak, but they have concentrated their efforts elsewhere.

The key problem with damages for President Trump is that he, well, won the presidential election (in the United States and indeed in Florida) after programme was broadcast (in the United Kingdom).

But nonetheless - perhaps to serve the media - he claims at least $5 billion.

It is not only a preposterous figure, it is an arbitrary one.

There is no greater case for that figure than for $5 million or 5 cents.

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The temptation of those opposed to Trump is to laugh and point at documents like this - and it does have some silly parts.

But the document is a serious one, if you understand the true purpose of such documents.

This is not a document for Trump to win a legal case before a court.

It is instead a document to exert pressure for a favourable settlement of the case: it is more a document for leverage than for litigation per se.

The document is structured so that the claim has the best chance of withstanding preliminary challenges on the bases of jurisdiction and/or lack of malice.

Trump and his lawyers know what they are doing.

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So what should the BBC do?

The BBC may want to just capitulate and offer (licence payers) money to Trump to make this all go away.

Or the BBC may want to contest the case on jurisdiction and lack of malice (and damages) to improve their position on early settlement.

Or, which would be preferable, the BBC should just prepare for trial - making any strong preliminary challenges along the way - without flinching or seeking early settlement.

The BBC made an undeniable (and indefensible) mistake (even if it caused Trump no damage and was made without malice).

And Trump smells blood.

But.

Trump and his lawyers are always weakest when they face resolute opposition.

The BBC have good lawyers and have access to good United States lawyers.

The BBC should now defend the case without equivocation.

For that is how Trump will either back down or, if in the interests of the BBC, accept a settlement more favourable to the BBC.

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FOOTNOTE (added 17 December 2025)

I have been asked why this post uses the figure of $5 billion, and not $10 billion used by others. The BBC also use the $5 billion figure.

In the claim it is the position that Trump asks for $5 billion twice, one for each cause of action.

But because both causes of action are on the same alleged facts I took that to mean that they were just two routes to the same overall amount, hence there would be double recovery for the alleged wrong(s). But I am not an American lawyer, and so I may be wrong (see provisos above).

The amounts are anyway arbitrary and preposterous.